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Introduction
In	many	ways	the	structure	of	the	Canadian	federation	is	very	different	from	the	
German	federation.		Most	notably,	the	Canadian	constitution	divides	between	fe-
deral	and	provincial	government	powers	to	legislate,	implement	and	administer	in	
specific	policy	areas	whereas	the	German	federation	is	noted	for	the	concentration	
of	legislative	powers	at	the	centre,	and	administrative	powers	among	the	Länder.	
Additionally,	the	German	federation	contrasts	the	Canadian	federation	in	terms	of	
the	representation	of	the	constituent	governments	in	the	central	institutions	of	
government.		Despite	the	challenges	of	an	“interlocked”	system,	many	Canadian	
observers	look	admiringly	to	the	German	example	of	Länder	government	represen-
tation	in	the	Bundesrat	and	lament	the	ineffectiveness	of	provincial	representation	
in	the	Canadian	Senate.	
But	despite	the	distinctions	in	the	structure	of	the	two	federations,	there	are	si-
milarities	in	the	conversations	among	politicians,	academics	and	ordinary	citizens	
regarding	the	perception	of	“problems”	with	the	federation	and	how	to	“fix”	them.	
The	search	for	ways	to	make	the	two	orders	of	government	more	effectively	create	
and	deliver	policies	to	citizens,	questions	about	the	appropriate	degree	of	autono-
my	for	constituent	units	of	the	federation,	concerns	about	whether	policies	should	
be	permitted	to	vary	across	constituent	units.		The	divergent	interests	of	a	specific	
Land	in	negotiations	with	the	central	government,	the	tension	between	conducting	
constitutional	deliberations	in	a	transparent	manner	involving	the	input	of	citizens	
and	negotiating	compromises	across	governments	–	all	of	these	threads	of	debate	
are	apparent	in	Canada	as	well.			
As	 in	Germany,	competitive	 federalism	has	been	a	subject	of	academic	debate.	
Vertical	competition	is	a	dynamic,	virtually	always	present	in	discussions	among	
the	Premiers	of	the	provinces	and	the	Prime	Minister	in	Canada.		However,	as	Ca-
nada	is	a	relatively	decentralized	federation,	horizontal	competition	is	also	evident	
from	time	to	time.		This	paper	considers	how	the	concept	of	competitive	federalism	
has	been	defined	in	Canadian	scholarship,	and	reviews	the	institutional,	economic	
and	political	characteristics	of	the	Canadian	federation	that	contribute	to	federal-
provincial	competition	and	interprovincial	competition	in	Canada.		I	will	explore	
how	“treaty	federalism”	or,	in	other	words,	negotiating	non-constitutional	agree-
ments	between	the	provinces	and	the	federal	government,	has	become	essential	
to	the	functioning	of	the	Canadian	federation	in	the	absence	of	the	possibility	of	
constitutional	change.		The	policy	impact	of	such	agreements,	negotiated	primarily	
in	the	late	1990s	is	just	now	becoming	evident.		In	theory	such	agreements	have	
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further	decentralized	the	Canadian	federation,	providing	provinces	with	even	more	
autonomy	in	their	spheres	of	jurisdiction.		In	short,	in	a	federation	where	formal	
constitutional	change	has	proven	impossible	in	the	last	few	decades,	vertical	com-
petition	has	come	to	be	mediated	through	treaty	federalism.		The	progressively	
unconditional	nature	of	fiscal	transfers	to	provinces	from	the	federal	government,	
coupled	with	provincial	jurisdiction	over	important	policy	areas	such	as	health-
care,	education	and	social	services,	give	provinces	considerable	discretion	in	the	
creation	of	provincial	welfare	states.		
Proponents	of	decentralization	of	 competencies	within	 federations	 in	Germany	
and	elsewhere	have	argued	that	local	governments	with	greater	autonomy	will	be	
more	likely	to	deregulate	markets,	reduce	their	taxes	and	welfare	state	services	all	
in	an	effort	to	compete	for	mobile	taxpayers	and	businesses.		While	some	welcome	
such	dynamics,	others	in	favour	of	more	robust	social	policies	have	argued	against	
decentralization.		Nevertheless	the	assumption	underlying	both	arguments	is	the	
same.		More	autonomous	constituent	units	will	adjust	the	balance	between	the	
market	and	the	state	in	favour	of	the	market	(Scharpf	2005).		Given	the	recent	de-
velopments	in	Canadian	federalism,	this	is	possible	to	consider	if	this	assumption	
holds	true	in	practice.		Drawing	upon	the	evidence	accumulated	from	academic	
studies	to	date,	this	paper	reveals	that	a	downward	spiral	of	interprovincial	com-
petition	has	not	resulted	from	Canada’s	decentralized	arrangements.		The	policies	
of	provinces	are	gradually	converging	in	several	areas.		However,	it	is	not	always	in	
the	direction	that	we	might	expect.		As	Gerard	Boychuck	has	argued,	the	effects	of	
decentralization	are	“multiple,	complex	and	contradictory”	(2003:	269).		This	paper	
concludes	by	considering	what	might	account	for	these	preliminary	findings.		
Federal-Provincial Relations: From Competitive to 
Constitutional to Collaborative and Treaty Federalism
Vertical	competition,	or	competition	between	the	provinces	and	the	federal	go-
vernment	was	most	apparent	when	Pierre	Elliott	Trudeau	was	prime	minister	of	
Canada	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 early	 1980s	 (Simeon	 and	Robinson	 1990).	 	 This	 era,	
known	as	“competitive	federalism”	in	the	academic	literature,	was	also	marked	by	
considerable	federal-provincial	conflict.		This	period	is	defined	by	the	growth	of	
provincial	welfare	states,	conflicts	over	revenue	sharing	following	the	expansion	
of	the	oil	sector	in	Alberta,	and	the	continued	rise	of	nationalism	in	Quebec.		This	
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era	culminated	with	the	patriation	of	the	Constitution	in	1982	absent	the	consent	
of	the	province	of	Quebec.		
But	in	many	respects,	vertical	competition	is	always	present	in	Canadian	politics.	
Consider	the	following.	 	The	constitution	enumerates	exclusive	areas	of	federal	
and	provincial	policy	jurisdiction.1		Yet,	the	complexities	of	modern-day	decision	
making	mean	that	the	federal	and	provincial	governments	must	communicate,	if	
not	jointly	devise	policy,	in	a	number	of	critical	policy	areas.		For	example,	envi-
ronmental	policy	in	Canada	is	not	specified	in	the	Canadian	constitution	as	eit-
her	a	federal	or	provincial	area	of	jurisdiction.		However,	with	the	ability	to	sign	
international	treaties	residing	with	the	federal	government,	and	jurisdiction	over	
natural	resources	residing	with	the	provincial	governments,	implementation	of	the	
Kyoto	Accord	requires	a	joint	approach.		Moreover,	the	provinces	rely	on	the	fede-
ral	government’s	fiscal	capacity	for	funding	social	policies	within	their	boarders.	
Provinces	have	jurisdiction	over	healthcare,	social	assistance	and	education.		Re-
venue	generation	through	direct	and	indirect	taxation	is	possible	for	both	orders	
of	government	in	Canada.		Yet,	by	themselves,	provincial	“own	source	revenues”	
have	proven	inadequate	for	developing	the	modern	welfare	state.		Both	provincial	
and	federal	governments	have	a	tendency	to	blame	the	other	order	of	government	
for	the	shortcomings	of	policies,	and	compete	to	take	credit	for	policies	that	are	
popular	among	Canadians.		
Canadian	federalism	is	also	competitive	because,	unlike	in	Germany,	provinces	are	
so	weakly	represented	in	Canada’s	central	institutions	of	government,	and	single	
party	governments	form	the	executives	in	parliamentary	settings	in	every	province.	
Accordingly,	provincial	premiers	can	compellingly	challenge	the	federal	govern-
ment,	arguing	that	they,	rather	than	elected	members	of	the	national	parliament,	
are	the	best	spokespersons	for	the	rights	of	citizens	within	their	boarders	(Bakvis	
and	Skogstad	2008).
The	diversity	of	demographic	characteristics	of	the	provinces	also	adds	to	the	com-
petitive	tendencies	of	the	Canadian	federation.		40%	of	Canada’s	population	lives	
in	Ontario,	one	of	the	ten	provinces.		The	French	speaking	population	of	Canada	is	
the	majority	in	one	province	Quebec,	while	all	other	provinces	have	English	spea-
king	majorities.		Quebec	and	Ontario	form	the	industrial	heartland	of	the	country,	
1	 The	residual	power	lies	with	the	federal	government,	though	the	decision	of	the	Judicial	Com-
mittee	of	the	Privy	Council	in	many	early	court	cases	post	Confederation	1867	lead	to	a	more	
decentralized	federation	that	was	intended	by	the	fathers	of	the	confederation.		The	residual	
power	was	narrowly	interpreted.	
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while	the	four	provinces	to	the	west	of	Ontario	and	the	four	provinces	to	the	east	
of	Quebec	have	economies	traditionally	based	on	natural	resource	development	and	
extraction.		There	are	considerable	economic	disparities	across	the	provinces	with	
Alberta,	home	to	much	of	Canada’s	oil	and	gas	reserves,	representing	the	richest	
of	the	provinces.		Ontario	is	second,	with	its	industrial	base.		However,	one	of	the	
poorest	provinces,	Newfoundland,	is	poised	to	become	one	of	the	more	affluent	
ones	with	the	growth	of	the	offshore	petroleum	industry	in	the	Atlantic.		Polling	
data	suggest	that	citizens	from	provinces	economically	and	geographically	loca-
ted	on	the	periphery	of	the	country	feel	a	sense	of	alienation	from	the	industrial,	
political	and	geographical	centre	of	the	country	(Henry	2002).		Each	province	has	
its	own	electoral	cycle,	distinct	from	the	central	(or	federal)	government	electoral	
cycle.		The	cities	of	Vancouver,	Toronto	and	Montreal	are	the	most	popular	destina-
tions	for	Canada’s	large	immigrant	population.		Accordingly,	the	provinces	of	British	
Columbia,	Ontario	and	Quebec	experience	cultural	and	social	challenges	different	
from	those	of	other	provinces.		As	a	result	of	these	dynamics,	the	dialogue	among	
provinces	and	between	provinces	and	the	federal	government,	as	it	plays	out	in	
the	televised	and	print	media,	can	have	a	competitive	undercurrent.		
How	have	Canadian	governments	dealt	with	these	competitive	dynamics?	 	The	
1980s	and	early	1990s	were	punctuated	by	two	major	attempts	to	formally	amend	
the	constitution.		One	of	the	main	thrusts	of	these	proposed	amendments	was	to	
give	provinces	greater	autonomy	in	decision	making.		Such	autonomy	was	thought	
to	be	essential	to	the	preservation	of	Quebec’s	distinctiveness	in	the	federation.	
Another	objective	of	the	proposed	amendments	was	to	give	provinces	greater	re-
presentation	in	the	second	chamber	of	Canada’s	federal	parliament.		Ultimately,	
both	the	Meech	Lake	Accord	of	1987	and	the	Charlottetown	Accord	of	1993	were	
rejected,	the	first	by	select	provincial	governments,	the	second	by	citizens	in	refe-
renda	held	across	the	country.		
In	1995	when	the	province	of	Quebec	held	a	referendum	on	sovereignty,	and	the	
federalist	side	won	by	one	percent,	then	Prime	Minister	Jean	Chretien	embarked	
on	an	era	of	non-constitutional	renewal	of	the	federation.		One	of	the	goals	of	a	
series	of	intergovernmental	agreements	on	issues	from	the	environment	to	inter-
national	trade	to	healthcare,	was	to	re-balance	the	powers	of	the	federal	and	pro-
vincial	governments	without	formal	constitutional	change.		It	was	thought	that	a	
new	specification	of	the	roles	and	responsibilities	of	the	two	orders	of	government	
might	just	demonstrate	to	Quebecers	the	flexibility	of	the	existing	federal-provin-
cial	arrangement	and	at	the	same	time	respond	to	the	pressures	in	several	other	
provinces	for	greater	say	in	shaping	cross-Canadian	policies	(Lazar	1998).		
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In	the	Canadian	context,	the	term	“treaty	federalism”	is	normally	associated	with	
Aboriginal	politics.		First	Nations	argue	that	a	transfer	of	sovereignty	from	First	
Nations	communities	to	the	“crown”	has	never	taken	place,	and	thus	when	dis-
agreements	between	the	federal	government	and	Aboriginal	communities	arise	in	
modern	times,	the	sovereign	parties	must	come	together	to	negotiate	new	under-
standings,	all	the	while	maintaining	their	respective	sovereignty	(Hueglin	2000).	
From	an	Aboriginal	perspective,	treaties	entail			“mutual	recognition	of	nationhood	
and	affirmations	of	commitment	to	a	continuous	nation-to-nation	relationship”	
(Ladner	2003,	p.	171).		As	Hueglin	(2008)	points	out,	in	many	respects,	federal-
provincial	non-constitutional	negotiations	are	also	a	form	of	treaty	federalism	in	
that	each	order	of	government	is	sovereign	in	its	own	spheres	of	jurisdiction,	and	
the	result	of	these	deliberations	can	be	contract-like	arrangements	between	the	
two	orders	of	government	which,	from	time	to	time	are	revisited,	renegotiated	and	
sometimes	replaced,	all	without	the	formal	transfer	of	authority	from	one	order	of	
government	to	another.					
Such	intergovernmental	policy	making	is	possible	in	the	Canadian	federation	by	
virtue	of	the	marriage	of	Westminster	style	parliamentary	decision-making	to	the	
institution	of	federalism.		With	the	power	to	speak	on	behalf	of	their	governments,	
premiers	and	the	prime	minister,	along	with	the	other	members	of	their	respective	
executives	thus	engage	in	“executive	federalism”	(Smiley	1976).		Such	extra-parlia-
mentary	intergovernmental	relations	have	defined	Canadian	federalism	throughout	
the	development	of	the	modern	welfare	state.2		
However,	whereas	in	the	1960s	the	provinces	accepted	federal	leadership	and	in-
fluence	in	provincial	spheres	of	jurisdiction	in	exchange	for	federal	financing,	in	
the	post-referendum	era,	they	have	been	much	less	likely	to	do	so.		In	this	sense,	
for	some	optimistic	observers,	the	post-referendum	intergovernmental	negotiations	
have	had	the	potential	to	be	even	more	treaty-like	than	those	of	the	1960s	in	that	
the	provinces	are	to	negotiate	with	the	federal	government	on	equal	footing	with	
neither	subordinate	to	the	other.		Hence,	some	Canadian	scholars	have	come	to	
label	 the	post-referendum	era	of	non-constitutional	agreements	as	 “collabora-
tive	federalism,”	a	maturation	of	the	“cooperative	federalism”	of	the	1960s.		The	
foundation	of	“collaborative	federalism”	is	the	view	that	the	federal	government	
ought	not	to	use	its	federal	spending	power	in	unilateral	ways,	or	develop	policy	
2	 In	the	immediate	post	World	War	II	era,	the	federal	government	was	in	a	superior	fiscal	posi-
tion.	However,	through	the	transfer	of	“tax	points”	to	the	provinces	in	1977,	the	government	
of	Canada	now	controls	a	slightly	larger	portion	of	tax	revenues	than	do	the	provinces	(Hueglin	
and	Fenna,	2006:	325).		
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with	provinces	through	intergovernmental	agreements	negotiated	in	a	hierarchical	
manner,	with	the	federal	government	holding	the	spending	power	trump	card	(Ca-
meron	and	Simeon	2002;	Lazar	2000;	Desautels	1999).		Provinces	routinely	express	
the	view	that	they	should	not	have	to	answer	to	the	federal	government	for	how	
they	spend	money	transferred	to	them	from	the	federal	government.
There	is	now	considerable	recognition	that	the	post	1995	negotiations	en	route	to	
intergovernmental	agreements	vary	from	policy	sector	to	policy	sector	in	the	ex-
tent	to	which	they	reflect	the	collaborative	or	treaty	model	of	non-subordination	
(e.g.	Lazar	2006).		Generally	speaking	however,	the	resulting	accords	or	agreements	
contain	a	broad	section	enumerating	the	common	purposes	of	federal	and	provin-
cial	governments	and	principles	to	which	they	both	agree,	commitments	to	work	
together	and	exchange	information	and	commitments	to	report	to	citizens	(rather	
than	to	each	other)	on	the	efficacy	of	policies	undertaken	as	a	result	of	the	ag-
reements.		Occasionally	the	agreements	include	mechanisms	of	resolving	disputes.	
Agreements	may	also	leave	the	option	for	more	specific	bi-lateral	agreements	bet-
ween	any	one	province	and	the	federal	government,	thus	permitting	asymmetrical	
arrangements	across	the	federation	(Simeon	and	Nugent	2008).		
Canada	has	survived	the	constitutional	impasse	of	the	1990s	in	part	because	of	
these	new	products	of	executive	federalism.		However,	these	intergovernmental	
agreements	are	not	without	their	critics.		First,	it	is	important	to	realize	that	these	
intergovernmental	agreements	are	virtually	never	legally	binding,	and	in	theory,	
can	be	ignored	by	the	governments	who	negotiated	them,	and	by	the	governments	
who	are	subsequently	elected.		Second,	they	are	the	product	of	extra-parliamen-
tary	negotiations	and	thus	lack	the	transparency	of	legislative	settings.		Indeed,	in	
some	policy	sectors	there	are	efforts	to	directly	engage	interested	policy	advocates	
in	information	exchange	and	even	deliberation	en	route	to	the	establishment	of	
an	intergovernmental	agreement.		However,	the	results	of	these	efforts	are	often	
sidelined	in	the	push	and	pull	of	federal-provincial	negotiation	(Simmons	2008a).	
Accordingly,	there	is	a	democratic	deficit	to	executive	federalism.		Third,	to	the	
extent	 that	provinces	can	develop	 “local”	 solutions	 to	policy	problems	 through	
greater	discretion	in	their	spheres	of	policy	jurisdiction,	there	is	concern	that	the	
cross-Canadian	fabric	of	social,	economic	and	environmental	policy	will	unravel.
In	short,	a	differentiated	sense	of	citizenship	may	supplant	a	universal	sense	of	
citizenship.	As	Keith	Banting	explains,	
National	social	programs	create	a	network	of	intimate	relations	bet-
ween	citizens	and	the	central	government	throughout	the	country,	
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helping	to	define	the	boundaries	of	the	national	political	community	
and	enhancing	the	legitimacy	of	the	states…	Social	programs	control-
led	by	the	central	government	can	become	instruments	of	nation	buil-
ding,	helping	to	mediate	regional	tensions	and	strengthen	the	states	
against	centrifugal	forces	rooted	in	territorial	politics.		Alternatively,	
social	programs	designed	and	controlled	at	the	regional	level	can	be-
come	instruments	for	strengthening	regional	cultures	by	enhancing	
the	significance	of	local	communities	in	the	lives	of	citizens,	thereby	
reinforcing	differentiation	and	centrifugal	tendencies	at	the	national	
level	(1995:	270-271	quoted	in	Boychuk	2003:	277).
More	specifically	in	the	Canadian	context,	the	mechanics	of	this	argument	are	as	
follows:	federal	intervention	in	social	policy	the	domain	of	the	provinces,	in	the	
form	of	conditional	fiscal	transfers	to	the	provinces	are	fundamental	in	ensuring	
consistency	in	social	citizenship	entitlements	across	Canada.			
As	noted	at	the	outset,	a	related	debate	focuses	on	whether	decentralization	will	
lead	to	a	competitive	race	among	constituent	units	 in	a	federation	resulting	in	
less	liberal	policies	than	those	created	through	centralized	directives.		The	classic	
race	to	the	bottom	theory	suggests	that,	 in	the	absence	of	central	government	
oversight,	federal	constituent	governments	are	likely	to	lower	taxes,	adopt	weak	
environmental	policies,	shrink	their	welfare	states,	and	relax	labour	laws,	all	in	an	
effort	attract	mobile	capital.		By	adopting	some	of	these	strategies,	constituent	
members	of	a	federation	are	more	welcoming	hosts	for	businesses	and	a	mobile	
labour	force.		More	generous	local	social	programs	will	become	“welfare	magnets”	
(Schram	and	Kruger,	1994),	which	will,	in	turn,	force	governments	to	adjust	the-
se	programs	downwards.		More	generally	there	is	a	concern	that	decentralization	
will	make	the	development	of	new	social	policy	developments	all	the	more	diffi-
cult	to	achieve.	
	Before	exploring	whether	these	concerns	have	been	born	out	following	the	nego-
tiation	of	several	new	intergovernmental	agreements	in	Canada,	it	is	useful	to	first	
consider,	by	way	of	example,	how	the	division	of	roles	and	responsibilities	between	
the	provinces	and	the	federal	government	has	been	transformed,	all	without	formal	
transfer	of	constitutional	authority.		
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Decentralizing the Federation: the 
Evolution of Fiscal Federalism
In	terms	of	fiscal	relations	between	the	two	orders	of	government,	two	major	de-
velopments	have	taken	place	in	the	post-referendum	era	that	have	enhanced	the	
autonomy	of	provincial	governments	in	the	sphere	of	social	policy.		First,	the	fe-
deral	government’s	watershed	1995	budget	removed	some	of	the	strings	attached	
to	payments	to	the	provinces.		Second,	in	1999	nine	of	the	ten	provinces	(absent	
Quebec)	agreed	 to	 the	Social	Union	Framework	Agreement,	which	significantly	
curbed	the	ability	of	the	federal	government	to	direct	social	policy	outcomes	in	
the	provinces	through	the	development	of	new	shared	cost	programs.	
In	the	Constitution	Act	1867	there	are	just	three	concurrent	areas	of	jurisdiction:	
immigration,	agriculture	and	old	age	pensions.		“Hospitals,	asylums	and	charities”	
however,	are	areas	of	exclusive	provincial	jurisdiction,	along	with	education.		This	
division	of	powers	meant	that	the	welfare	state	was	actually	slow	to	grow	in	Ca-
nada.		For	example,	the	judiciary	ruled	that	the	federal	government	did	not	have	
the	authority	to	establish	an	unemployment	insurance	program	during	the	depres-
sion.3		However,	beginning	in	the	1950s,	Canadian	governments	built	their	wel-
fare	states	by	taking	advantage	of	shared-cost	programs	initiated	by	the	federal	
government.		The	federal	government	induced	provinces	to	develop	and	spend	on	
social	welfare	programs	by	matching	dollar	for	dollar	funds	provinces	put	towards	
job	training,	post-secondary	education,	hospitals	and	medical	insurance	plans,	to	
name	a	few.		In	1961,	major	cash	transfers	to	the	provinces	represented	approxi-
mately	24%	of	provincial	revenue.		By	1999,	however,	this	number	would	decline	
to	13%	(Brown	2002:	68).		
Canada	is	now	distinguished	from	other	federations	in	that	in	almost	all	of	its	in-
tergovernmental	transfers	take	the	form	of	block	payments.		In	1977	the	shared	
cost	approach	to	building	the	welfare	state	had	been	replaced	with	a	block	grant	
approach	for	all	major	policy	areas	except	for	provincial	social	assistance	(wel-
fare).	 	The	major	block	grant	 for	post	secondary	education	and	healthcare	was	
not	unconditional	however.		Provinces	had	to	maintain	the	tenets	of	the	Canada	
Health	Act	introduced	by	the	federal	government	in	1984.		This	act	aims	to	ensure	
“universal	coverage”	for	all	“medically	necessary”	hospital	and	physician	services.	
Doctors	are	not	permitted	to	bill	patients	for	such	services,	and	no	private	health	
3	 The	Constitution	Act	1867	was	subsequently	amended	so	that	the	federal	government	had	
jurisdiction	over	unemployment	insurance.
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insurance	schemes	exist	for	“queue	jumping”	as	is	the	case	in	the	United	Kingdom	
and	New	Zealand,	for	example	(Flood	et	al	2008).		In	addition	to	this	block	funding	
and	own	source	revenues,	most	provinces	funded	their	provincial	health	programs	
through	 the	unconditional	Equalization	Program,	first	 introduced	 in	 the	1950s,	
which	aims	to	redistribute	funds	from	“have”	provinces,	or	more	affluent	ones,	to	
“have	not”	provinces	or	less	affluent	ones,	according	to	a	specific	formula.4		While	
this	formula	has	changed	over	time,	this	program	is	intended	to	ensure	that	all	
provinces,	irrespective	of	their	individual	fiscal	capacity,	can	provide	comparable	
services	at	comparable	rates	of	taxation,	a	principle	now	enshrined	in	the	Cana-
dian	Constitution	Act	1982.	
In	1995	the	fiscal	landscape	changed	dramatically.		In	an	effort	to	balance	its	own	
budget,	the	federal	government	unilaterally	reduced	its	transfer	payments	to	the	
provinces	with	the	introduction	of	the	Canada	Health	and	Social	Transfer.		This	
new	block	fund	collapsed	the	remaining	shared	cost	program	for	social	assistance	
with	the	block	fund	for	post	secondary	education	and	healthcare.		Aside	from	the	
Canada	Health	Act	requirements,	the	only	other	condition	attached	to	the	new	
transfer	as	it	pertained	to	social	assistance	was	that	provinces	could	not	introdu-
ce	“residency	requirements.”		That	is,	if	a	province	wanted	the	federal	money	they	
could	not	establish	a	social	assistance	program	that	required	citizens	to	 live	 in	
their	province	for	a	specific	length	of	time	before	being	eligible.		Thus,	the	Canada	
Health	and	Social	Transfer	significantly	disentangled	the	federal	government	from	
the	provinces	in	the	field	of	social	assistance.		Considerable	provincial	diversity	in	
programs	was	now	permitted.		
Vertical	competition	to	avoid	blame	for	the	subsequent	pressures	on	the	health	care	
marked	the	federal-provincial	relations	of	the	late	1990s	even	amidst	the	spirit	of	
collaboration.		As	provinces	struggled	to	continue	to	meet	citizen	expectations	for	
social	programs,	and	adhere	to	the	Canada	Health	Act,	premiers	sought	to	bring	
greater	predictability	to	the	federal	use	and	“disuse”	of	the	federal	spending	power	
and	sought	an	even	greater	role	in	establishing	principles	to	guide	social	policy.	
With	a	reduced	federal	financial	presence	in	provincial	social	programs,	provin-
cial	governments	could	compellingly	argue	that	they	had	a	greater	right	to	judge	
within	their	own	provincial	boundaries	what	was	in	the	national	and	provincial	
interests	of	their	residents.	
4	 Ontario	is	the	only	province	never	to	have	received	Equalization	payments.		Currently	there	are	
four	“have”	provinces:	British	Columbia,	Alberta,	Saskatchewan	and	Ontario.	
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The	Social	Union	Framework	Agreement	(SUFA)	is	the	result	of	those	efforts.		For	
over	a	year	intergovernmental	officials	met	to	negotiate	a	deal,	to	no	avail.		Then	in	
January	of	1999,	then	Prime	Minister	Jean	Chrétien	met	with	premiers	in	a	closed	
meeting	at	his	residence,	and	nine	of	the	ten	premiers	(absent	Quebec)	agreed	to	
new	terms	for	the	use	of	the	federal	spending	power	with	an	offer	of	an	additional	
2.5	billion	dollars	for	health	care	on	the	dinner	table.
Under	the	new	agreement,	the	collaboration	between	the	federal	government	and	
the	provinces	is	required	in	shaping	future	social	policies.		The	federal	government	
agrees	not	to	introduce	new	cost	shared	or	bock	funded	initiatives	in	health	care,	
post-secondary	education	social	assistance	and	social	services	without	the	agree-
ment	of	a	majority	of	provincial	governments.		At	first	glance,	this	appears	to	be	a	
significant	constraint	on	the	federal	use	of	its	spending	power.		This	is	particularly	
noteworthy	because	of	the	shared	understanding	among	many	social	policy	advo-
cates	in	Canada	that	federal	government	oversight	of	social	programs	is	essential	
to	strengthening	social	policies	in	the	federation.		Kent	(2007)	opines	that	SUFA	
virtually	closes	the	door	on	this	traditional	use	of	the	federal	spending	power	be-
cause	of	the	likelihood	of	the	four	largest	provinces	in	Canada	(representing	85%	
of	the	population)	opting	out	of	any	new	federal	social	policy	initiatives.		
However,	at	the	same	time,	SUFA	states	that	“when	the	federal	government	intro-
duces	new	Canada-wide	initiatives	funded	through	direct	transfers	to	individuals	
or	organizations	for	health	care,	post-secondary	education,	social	assistance	and	
social	services,	it	will,	prior	to	implementation,	give	at	least	three	months’	notice	
and	offer	to	consult.”		This	aspect	of	the	agreement	is	remarkable	for	two	reasons.	
First,	it	permits	the	federal	government	to	exercise	its	spending	power	by	giving	
funds	directly	to	citizens	or	organizations	for	programs	in	areas	of	provincial	re-
sponsibility	without the consent of the provincial governments.		In	this	sense,	SUFA	
constrains	one	use	of	the	federal	spending	power,	but	facilitates	another.		It	is	not	
surprising	that	the	Quebec	government,	which	has	never	acknowledged	the	legi-
timacy	of	the	federal	spending	power,	did	not	agree	to	SUFA.		It	is	also	not	surpri-
sing	that,	given	the	cash-strapped	nature	of	the	other	provinces	still	reeling	from	
the	cuts	in	the	federal	1995	budget,	the	other	nine	provincial	premiers	agreed	to	
these	terms	in	exchange	for	additional	funds	for	health	care.
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Policy Developments following Decentralization:  
A Competitive Race to the Bottom?
How	has	SUFA	affected	social	policy	and	how	have	the	other	“treaties”	of	the	post-
referendum	era	affected	the	functioning	of	the	federation?		Has	a	more	decentra-
lized	federation	contributed	to	interprovincial	competition	and	a	downward	spiral?	
It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	consider	every	agreement.		However,	the	
answer	is	not	straight	forward.		In	the	area	of	health	care,	the	federal	government	
continues	to	demand	that	provinces	uphold	the	tenets	of	the	Canada	Health	Act,	
ensuring	that	irrespective	of	the	province	in	which	they	live,	Canadians	have	equi-
table	access	to	a	state	regulated	health	care	system.		Thus,	even	with	considerable	
funding	pressures,	there	has	been	limited	provincial	experimentation	with	other	
forms	of	health	care	provision.		With	its	budget	balanced,	the	federal	government	in	
2004	agreed	to	a	ten	year	funding	arrangement	for	health	care,	following	a	major	
high	profile	summit	of	the	premiers	and	the	prime	minister.		Interestingly,	some	of	
the	41	billion	dollars	that	the	federal	government	estimated	this	deal	represented	
was	“targeted”	towards	reducing	waiting	times	for	specific	surgeries,	but	not	a	
condition	of	receipt	for	the	funding.		
Indeed,	there	are	provincial	variations	in	health	care	systems.		For	example,	provincial	
governments	have	made	marginal	changes	to	their	respective	lists	of	medical	pro-
cedures	funded	under	each	provincial	insurance	scheme,	and	regional	boards	have	
been	introduced	in	many	jurisdictions	as	a	way	of	cutting	the	costs	of	healthcare	
governance.		Alberta,	the	province	most	outspoken	in	challenging	the	uniformity	
imposed	by	the	Canada	Health	Act,	published	a	report	in	2001	which	created	a	
roadmap	for	introducing	greater	private	care	provisions	in	the	public	care	system.	
However,	even	Alberta	shied	away	from	this	direction	of	reform	when	it	became	
apparent	that	the	citizens	in	this	province	did	not	support	it	(Maioni	2008).		There	
have	also	been	some	instances	of	violations	of	the	Canada	Health	Act	upon	which	
the	federal	government	has	not	acted.		Nevertheless,	the	federal	government	con-
tinues	to	provide	the	conditional	glue	(in	the	form	of	the	Canada	Health	Act)	re-
sulting	in	uniformity	of	norms	guiding	health	care	regimes	in	the	provinces.			
Outside	of	the	health	care	arena,	the	evidence	is	mixed.		Harrison	(2006a)	concludes	
from	six	cross-provincial	comparisons	of	policy	that	provinces	are	not	engaged	in	
a	spiral	of	declining	taxes,	shrinking	welfare	states	and	labour	and	environmental	
regulations	and	are	capable	of	resisting	competitive	pressures.		Indeed,	there	is	
some	evidence	of	downward	trends	in	standards.		For	example	in	his	consideration	
of	social	assistance	provisions	in	the	provinces	Boychuck	(2006)	identified	a	decline	
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across	provinces.		At	the	same	time	however,	he	has	concluded	that	“there	is	little	
concrete	evidence	of	a	significant	shift	in	the	actual	provision	of	social	assistance	
resulting	directly	from	the	changing	federal	role	in	the	field	(2003:	269).		In	con-
trast,	McKenzie	(2006)	identified	an	overall	increase	in	provincial	taxes	on	business	
over	the	last	thirty	years.		In	the	cases	of	environmental	standards	(Olewiler,	2006)	
and	economic	development	(Brown	2006)	provinces	have	attempted	to	coordinate	
their	policies,	in	an	effort	to	prevent	a	competitive	race	to	the	bottom.		Perhaps	
most	intriguingly,	Green	and	Harrison	(2006)	discovered	of	a	“convergence	in	the	
middle”	in	minimum	wage	setting	across	provinces.		The	only	clear	evidence	of	a	
race	to	the	bottom	was	on	provincial	taxes	on	tobacco	(Harrison	2006b).
Research	on	Canada’s	National	Child	Benefit	also	suggests	a	gradual	convergence	
across	provinces	over	a	ten	year	period	(Simmons	2008b).		In	1998	the	provinces	
and	the	federal	government	devised	a	new	social	program	very	much	in	accordance	
with	the	parameters	of	SUFA.		The	National	Child	Benefit	has	two	components.	
The	federal	government	supplements	the	Canada	Child	Tax	Benefit,	providing	ad-
ditional	income	to	low	income	families.		This	additional	income	is	known	as	the	
NCB	Supplement.	 	Provinces,	with	 jurisdiction	over	 social	assistance,	may	 then	
reduce	social	assistance	recipients’	incomes	by	the	value	of	the	NCB	Supplement.	
The	provinces	then	reinvest	these	funds	in	a	variety	of	provincial	programs	bene-
fiting	children	and	families.		While	there	is	no	net	change	to	the	incomes	of	social	
assistance	recipients,	the	working	poor,	or	low	income	families	not	on	social	as-
sistance	see	an	increase	in	their	incomes,	and,	in	theory,	an	increase	in	programs	
and	services	provided	by	their	provincial	government.		
In	as	much	as	the	federal	government	provides	additional	income	to	low	income	
families,	the	federal	spending	power	takes	the	form	of	a	direct	transfer	to	citizens,	
as	permitted	 in	SUFA.	 	 The	 federal	government	provides	 income	support,	while	
the	provinces	are	to	provide	services,	thus	disentangling	the	relationship	between	
the	two.		In	as	much	as	provinces	can	decide	how	to	spend	the	money	they	save	
through	reducing	social	assistance	incomes,	and	are	not	directly	accountable	to	
the	federal	government,	this	is	not	a	conditional	grant.	
This	new	scheme	is	not	without	its	critics.		(Pulkingham	and	Ternowetsky,	1999;	
McKeen,	2001;	Patterson	et	al	2004).		However,	it	suggests	that	new	social	policy	
development	is	possible	in	the	absence	of	the	federal	government	imposing	it.		In	
terms	of	the	nature	of	provincial	investments,	initially	there	was	considerable	va-
riation	across	provinces.		However,	it	now	appears	that	most	provinces	are	follow-
ing	a	similar	pattern	in	as	much	as	they	provide	a	provincial	child	benefit	(income	
supplement)	to	low	income	families	(Simmons	2008b).
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But,	looking	to	the	field	of	early	learning	and	child	care,	one	can	also	make	the	
case	that	the	new	social	policy	development	has	been	obstructed	following	SUFA.	
In	2006	the	Organization	of	Economic	Co-Cooperation	and	Development	reported	
that	spending	on	early	education	and	care	of	children	as	a	percentage	of	GDP	is	
lowest	in	Canada.		We	are	a	laggard	compared	to	Western	Europe	and	even	compa-
red	to	the	United	States.		While	most	industrialized	countries	have	well	organized	
systems	of	early	learning	and	child	care,	there	is	no	national	approach	in	Canada	
and	no	province	has	a	large	scale	system	of	high	quality	early	learning	and	child	
care	 programs	 even	 though	mothers’	workforce	 participation	 is	 relatively	 high	
(Friendly	and	White	2008).		This	is	despite	the	recognition	among	child	develop-
ment	researchers	that	such	early	year	programs	are	important	for	children’s	future	
developmental,	social	and	economic	success.
In	the	2004	federal	election,	a	significant	part	of	the	Liberal	party	platform	was	
early	learning	and	child	care.		Ultimately	this	party	won	the	election,	forming	a	
minority	government.		After	lengthy	negotiations,	social	services	ministers	from	
across	the	country	agreed	to	four	principles	to	guide	the	future	of	early	childhood	
development.		Care	should	be	high	quality,	universal,	accessible	and	developmen-
tally	focused	(QUAD).		However,	because	different	provinces	had	different	visions	
as	to	how	to	implement	these	four	broad	principles,	the	federal	government	was	
unable	to	get	the	provinces	to	agree	to	a	more	specific	program.		Accordingly,	the	
federal	government	then	negotiated	individual	five	year	bilateral	agreements	for	
funding	for	provinces	to	begin	to	develop	comprehensive	early	learning	and	care	
schemes.		Ultimately,	the	minority	government	fell,	and	the	new	federal	minority	
government,	under	the	Conservative	Party,	backed	out	of	all	ten	agreements	after	
one	year.		Instead,	the	new	federal	government	has	chosen	to	exercise	its	spending	
power	by	forging	direct	fiscal	relationships	with	citizens,	rather	than	with	provin-
ces,	and	now	provides	a	very	small	($1200)	annual	taxable	allowance	(presumably	
for	child	care)	to	families	with	children	under	six.
Friendly	and	White	(2008)	summarize	the	situation	this	way:	“Three	years	of	in-
tergovernmental	negotiations	[…]	have	left	us	exactly	where	we	were	before:	with	
no	national	early	learning	and	child-care	system	and	with	little	progress	in	most	
regions.		This	policy	outcome	reflects	a	failure	of	the	way	federalism	is	practiced	
in	Canada”	(p.	197).		In	the	past,	the	federal	government	could	have	imposed	upon	
provinces	a	new	shared	cost	national	program.		Now,	in	having	to	work	collabora-
tively	with	the	provinces,	the	development	of	a	national	scheme	has	proven	elusi-
ve.		The	non-legal	nature	of	intergovernmental	agreements	meant	that	the	newly	
elected	conservative	government	could	back	out	of	the	bilateral	deals	made	by	
its	predecessor.		However,	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	the	federal	Liberal	go-
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vernment	lacked	political	will	to	impose	a	national	program	on	provinces.		In	this	
sense,	it	is	not	so	much	that	SUFA	restrained	the	federal	government	but	that	the	
federal	government	restrained	itself.		
Understanding Patterns of Convergence
To	sum	up,	in	the	treaty	federalism	or	collaborative	federalism	era,	provinces	have	
greater	autonomy	in	a	number	of	policy	areas	from	the	environment	to	social	po-
licy.		The	federal	government	cannot	unilaterally	introduce	conditional	shared	cost	
grants	as	a	way	of	homogenizing	policies	across	provinces.		New	intergovernmen-
tal	agreements	are	less	hierarchical	than	those	of	the	1960s	in	that	provinces	are	
generally	no	longer	accountable	to	the	federal	government	for	how	they	spend	
funds	transferred	from	the	federal	government,	but	rather,	are	directly	accountable	
to	citizens	through	issuing	public	reports.		Under	these	conditions,	one	can	argue	
that	Canada	has	become	a	more	decentralized	federation.		However,	to	date,	there	
is	little	evidence	supporting	either	the	view	that	greater	decentralization	leads	to	a	
competitive	race	to	the	bottom,	or	that	greater	decentralization	has	prevented	the	
development	of	new	social	programs.		There	are	several	instances	of	convergence,	
suggesting	that	“differentiated	citizenship”	has	not	(yet)	overtaken	“universal	citi-
zenship.”		Moreover,	there	is	little	evidence	of	convergence	at	the	“lowest	common	
denominator.”		Convergence	is	also	sometimes	the	result	of	deliberate	attempts	to	
coordinate	policy	across	the	provinces.		
How	do	we	make	sense	of	these	findings?		Simeon	has	rather	eloquently	and	suc-
cinctly	observed	the	following:	“federalism	permits	divergence	and	difference;	it	
does	not	require	 it.”	 	For	him,	the	presence	of	convergence	 in	provincial	policy	
outcomes	even	without	the	same	degree	of	federal	intervention	common	in	the	
1960s,	is	attributable	to	shared	policy	preferences	among	Canadian	citizens,	irre-
spective	of	the	province	in	which	they	live.		He	reasons	that,	“even	if	policy-making	
and	delivery	are	highly	decentralized	to	provincial	governments,	if	their	citizens	all	
embrace	similar	conceptions	of	social	citizenship,	the	results	will	also	be	similar”	
(Simeon	2006:	39).
One	possible	explanation	for	the	absence	of	races	to	the	bottom	is	that	one	of	the	
principle	assumptions	of	this	argument	does	not	hold	in	the	Canadian	case.		Boy-
chuck	(2003)	observes	that	in	an	era	of	globalization	and	international	competi-
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tion,	mobility	of	capital	within	a	country	is	as	important	a	focus	for	governments	
as	the	possibility	of	capital	exciting	a	country	entirely.		However,	the	assumption	
of	citizen	migration	in	search	of	the	most	generous	package	of	provincial	benefits	
requires	greater	scrutiny.		Particularly	in	Canada,	where	citizens	live	in	five	diffe-
rent	time	zones,	is	not	a	reality.
There	does	 seem	 to	be	 evidence	however,	 that	 provinces	 sometimes	 engage	 in	
“benchmarking”	which	results	in	convergence,	though	not	necessarily	at	the	lo-
west	common	denominator.		Harrison	concludes	that	provincial	governments	look	
to	the	standards	in	other	provinces	to	evaluate	the	reasonableness	of	their	own,	
seeking	to	remain	“in-line.”		Harrison’s	(2006b)	consideration	of	provincial	tobacco	
taxes	revealed	that	emulation	across	provinces	is	particularly	evident	when	political	
actors,	not	necessarily	government,	publicize	variances	across	provinces.		Seeking	
to	avoid	voter	punishment,	outlier	provinces	fall	in	step.		My	own	research	on	the	
National	Child	Benefit	also	reveals	this	benchmarking	dynamic.		However,	an	even	
more	significant	influence	has	been	the	role	of	specific	policy	entrepreneurs	who	
network	with	public	servants	through	the	web	of	executive	federalism	and	spread	
ideas	which	in	turn	inform	policies	similar	in	design	(Simmons	2008).
But	the	presence	of	similar	programs	in	provinces,	even	in	the	absence	of	federally	
devised	conditional	shared	cost	programs	must	be	understood	against	the	backdrop	
of	Canada’s	Equalization	Program.		Without	the	transfer	of	revenue	from	one	pro-
vince	to	another	via	the	federal	government	through	this	program,	there	would	no	
doubt	be	fundamentally	different	patterns	of	convergence	and	divergence	in	the	
Canadian	federation.		This	program	does	not	pre-determine	provincial	convergence	
or	prevent	races	to	the	bottom,	but	it	ensures	that	provinces	have	the	ability	to	
create	citizenship	entitlements	at	other	places	on	the	top	to	bottom	continuum.		
Some	observers	contend	that	Canadian’s	commitment	to	redistribution	of	wealth	
across	the	provinces	through	the	Equalization	Program	may	erode	as	the	percen-
tage	of	Canadians	 living	 in	cities	 rises,	and	Canada’s	ethnic	diversity	 increases.	
Canada’s	rate	of	foreign	born	citizens	–	roughly	18%	is	second	only	to	Australia’s.	
The	fear	is	that	urban	dwellers	will	be	more	concerned	with	poverty	in	their	city	
than	with	poverty	 in	a	province	several	time	zones	away,	and	that	 immigrants,	
less	familiar	with	Canada’s	federal	political	community,	will	be	less	convinced	by	
the	logic	of	Equalization	payments	(Chaudhry,	2006).		Nevertheless,	others	point	
out	that,	while	provinces	may	bicker	about	the	equalization	formula,	no	province	
directly	attacks	the	principle	of	equalization	itself	(Simeon	2003:	139).		Opinion	
polls	suggest	that	support	for	the	transfer	of	money	from	richer	to	poorer	provinces	
was	at	85%	in	2004	(Noel	2006:	63).		Moreover,	public	opinion	research	suggests	
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that	within	one	generation,	the	children	of	 immigrants	have	virtually	the	same	
values	as	those	whose	parents	were	born	in	Canada	(Mendelsohn	2003	cited	in	
Noel	2006:	64).		Contrary	to	findings	in	Western	Europe,	“there	appears	to	be	no	
direct	impact	of	ethnic	diversity	on	support	for	social	welfare	programs”	(Soroka,	
Johnston	and	Banting	2007:	296).
Federalism	is	a	process	as	much	as	it	is	a	structure.		The	era	of	treaty	federalism	
has	seen	Canada	around	the	constitutional	impasse	of	the	late	1980s	and	early	
1990s.		In	the	absence	of	constitutional	change,	the	Canadian	federation	conti-
nues	to	evolve.		Our	experience	with	relatively	autonomous	constituent	units	has,	
to	date,	not	significantly	eroded	Canadians’	sense	of	universal	citizenship	or	Ca-
nadians’	commitment	to	redistribution	of	wealth	across	provinces.		Whether	this	
will	remain	the	case	is	not	clear.		Nevertheless,	the	Canadian	experience	reminds	
us	that	the	relationship	between	autonomy	and	decentralization	and	convergence	
and	divergence	is	complex	and	considerably	informed	by	the	environment	in	which	
it	takes	place.		
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